Dwell Times and Deployments

The military deploys. That's the nature of an expeditionary defense force. It is certainly more desirable, albeit expensive, to fight an enemy in their backyard than in your own.

When fighting the "Long War" as we are now, forces are deployed frequently. Often times, high-demand units (special ops, helicopters, infantry, EOD, etc.) without large numbers find themselves doing numerous repeat deployments.

Over time, these repeat deployments start to deteriorate the combat capacity of these units. Training cycles lapse, morale degrades, families are stressed, and retention falls to abysmal levels.

The DoD uses a metric known as dwell rate to depict a particular unit's deployment frequency, given in a ratio of time deployed to time at home. For example, a unit that is deployed for six months and then home for a year has a 1:2 dwell. the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) describes a sustainable dwell rate of 1:3-1:5 for its military units. A dwell rate of 1:2-1:3 is not considered sustainable, but can be used for high-tempo, short-term/duration operations. A 1:1-1:2 dwell rate causes "significant" deterioration in retention, proficiency, and force development. Anything less than 1:1 is clearly in the "red zone" with units being exhausted as fast as they are deployed. Retention and force development are near zero.

The USAF HH-60G community has been at a 1:1-1:2 dwell rate since 1993. Since 2005, the community writ large has been at 1:1. The OSD characterization of this level is:

"Rate of decay is rapid.  Significant mission tasks cannot be trained, development of forces all but ceases. Historically has resulted in significant losses due to lack of training and proficiency in basic mission tasks."

USAF Rescue forces continue to do their job, and do it well. Take for instance my previous article on the "Pedros" with hundreds of lives saved and record-breaking combat tempos. Unfortunately, job satisfaction alone will not provide enough long-term impetus to secure aircrew retention.

So what is the answer? Several studies have been done on this subject, but but comes down to supply and demand. Either the supply of forces (right now a force of 112 helicopters, 40% of which is Guard/Reserve) must increase, or the demand must go down. Joint and USAF studies have determined a force of 141-171 would be necessary to sustain current demand and support future requirements at a dwell of 1:2 or better.

This still does not meet the long-term sustainable level of 1:3-1:5 prescribed by OSD guidance. And with the recent decision to maintain the HH-60G force at 112, it would seem that digging the HH-60G force out of its 1:1 hole is still not achievable with current demand.

Any Other 4-Stars Out There?

I usually don't put much stock in MSN.com articles, but this was an interesting feature. The "search"-type feature began with a quick paragraph on Gen Stanley McChrystal's recent fate. It then went on to identify ten "notable" four-stars, to include Generals Petraeus, Franks, Powell, Abizaid, Schwartzkopf, Clark, Eisenhower, Bradley, MacArthur, and Patton.



While few can deny that each one of these great men left their mark on U.S. history, I have to wonder: why wasn't there a single Marine, Navy, or Air Force 4-star on the list? The likely answer is that the preponderance of theater commanders (now identified as Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) - the four-stars that lead organizations such as CENTCOM and their subordinate commands such as U.S. Forces-Iraq or Afghanistan) have been Army. When these COCOMs see action (as CENTCOM has in the last 20 years), then their leader likely has an opportunity to do some great things that get exposure.

Furthermore, these highest-level military commands (put in place by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986) draw only the best types of leaders. That is not to say that the best kind of leaders only exist in the Army, however. It would seem, however, that the majority of military campaigns executed in U.S. history have been land-force-based conflicts. The key exception would be Operation ALLIED FORCE, which was, by and large, an air campaign. Add to that the overwhelming number of soldiers in theater over sailors, marines, and airmen,and it might make sense that COCOMs have been led by U.S. Army four-stars.

According to Goldwater-Nichols, any 4-star of any service is eligible for a COCOM post, but traditions do follow. For instance, a Navy 4-star traditionally fills the Pacific Command (PACOM) position while a USAF General takes the Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) spot. Media-focused COCOMS like CENTCOM, however, usually have an Army General (Although USN ADM Fallon and USMC General Zinni are exceptions).

A Fallen Hero

Today was the memorial service for Capt David Wisniewski, a USAF HH-60G Pave Hawk pilot that was shot down June 9th while performing combat operations in Afghanistan. Four other brave airmen perished in the crash, but Capt Wisniewski held on until finally succumbing to his injuries on July 2nd.

The local Las Vegas news article is: http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/jul/15/nellis-airman-remembered-dedication-memorial/#comments

I had the distinct honor and privilege of serving with Capt Wisniewski at the 33rd Rescue Squadron in Okinawa, flew with him on his first combat mission in Afghanistan in 2006, and was one of his instructors at the Weapons School in 2008. He is a National Treasure who gave the Last Full Measure of Devotion. His Legacy will live on in USAF Rescue, and he will be dearly missed by family and friends.

These Things He Did, That Others Will Live

Pedros Do Vietnam Legacy Proud

In Vietnam, the USAF performed hundreds of successful Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) missions using a few different platforms. The Sikorsky HH-3's and HH-53's used the radio call sign "Jolly" after the well-known Jolly Green Giant. The HH-3 helicopters were affectionately named the "Jolly Green" while the later-introduced HH-53 was dubbed "Super Jolly Green," having more payload and power than the HH-3.

For years, USAF CSAR aicrews and pararescumen (PJ) have worn the unofficial Jolly Green Rescue Patch and often fly under the call sign "Jolly," even though they have been operating the venerable HH-60G Pave Hawk since the 80's.

A lesser known (or advertised) Vietnam legacy is that of the "Pedros," valiant USAF CSAR crews that operated the Kaman HH-43 Huskie. The helicopters were small, unarmed, and boasted wooden rotor blades. Although a seemingly less capable aircraft, the crews and PJ's were barve and skilled. William H. Pitsenbarger, who posthumously received the Medal of Honor (upgraded later from the AF Cross), was on an HH-43F when he was killed on 11 April, 1966.


In May 2009, HH-60G crews and PJ's in Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) reincarnated the Pedro call sign. Since then, these crews have braved enemy fire time after time to support and recover Coalition personnel through Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC), CSAR, Emergency Exfiltration, Resupply, and Close Air Support (CAS). Pedros in OEF comprise less than 5% of the total helicopter force in theater, however they are accomplishing nearly half the recovery workload. They have set records for flight hours, combat missions, and lives saved.


Recently, a crew from the 33rd Rescue Squadron performed a daring mission on 29 July 2009, earning the 2009 Mackay Trophy and deservedly several decorations for valor. The Air Force Times article can be found at: http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2010/05/airforce_mackay_trophy_052910w/

So this goes out to the Pedros in Afghanistan: Great Job, Godspeed, and Master Arm On!